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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






MARIO BENABE DE LEON-GRAMAJO 
a/k/a Mario Bernabe de Leon, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                               Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A73 768 863) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Mirlande Tadal 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 20, 2010 
 Before:  SCIRICA, FISHER and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Filed: October 25, 2010) 
 ___________ 
 




Mario Benabe De Leon-Gramajo, a citizen of Guatemala, entered the United 
States in September 1985.  In 2006, he was charged with removability pursuant to 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)] 
(present without being admitted or paroled).  De Leon-Gramajo conceded that he was 
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removable and applied for cancellation of removal pursuant to INA § 240A [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b].  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied De Leon-Gramajo’s cancellation 
application, finding that he failed to establish that his removal would result in exceptional 
and extremely unusual hardship to his United States citizen children.  The Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed De Leon-Gramajo’s appeal on May 13, 2008.  
De Leon-Gramajo filed a motion to reopen, which the BIA denied on October 31, 2008, 
based on De Leon-Gramajo’s failure to state any new facts or establish that he was prima 
facie eligible for cancellation of removal.  On March 10, 2009, the Board denied a second 
motion to reopen and a request for reconsideration of the original denial of reopening.   
Undeterred, De Leon-Gramajo filed another motion to reconsider and to reopen.  
He continued to allege that his children would face extreme hardship if he was removed 
to Guatemala.  In particular, De Leon-Gramajo claimed that his children “do not know 
how to read or write Spanish,” that he “has no where to live with his children,” that gang 
violence is prevalent in Guatemala, and that the IJ “erred in not [considering] the country 
conditions . . . .”  On June 25, 2009, the BIA denied relief, noting that the motion 
challenged its May 13, 2008, decision, that it was untimely, and that no exceptions to the 
time-bar were applicable.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), (c)(2)-(3).   The Board also 
refused to reopen sua sponte, stating that De Leon-Gramajo had not demonstrated that his 
situation was exceptional.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).  De Leon-Gramajo filed a timely 
petition for review.   
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We have jurisdiction over the petition for review pursuant to INA § 242 [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252].
1
  We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen or reconsider for abuse of 
discretion.  See Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005).  The Board’s 
decision is entitled to “broad deference.”  Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  To succeed, De Leon-Gramajo must demonstrate that the discretionary 
decision was arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  See McAllister, 444 F.3d at 185. 
Notably, De Leon-Gramajo does not challenge the two primary grounds for the 
Board’s decision, namely, that he sought review only of the original final order of 
removal and that the motion was time-barred.
2
  See Bradley v. Att’y Gen., 603 F.3d 235, 
243 n.8 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that argument not raised in opening brief is waived).  
Instead, he alleges that the BIA “wrongly applied the law governing the sua sponte 
mechanism to reopen because there were . . . exceptional circumstances . . . .”  Pet’r’s Br. 
13.  According to De Leon-Gramajo, protection of his children’s rights under the 
Constitution and international treaties warranted sua sponte reopening.  See id. at 13-21.  
                                                 
1
 The petition for review was timely only as to order entered June 25, 2009,  
denying reopening and reconsideration.  Therefore, in this proceeding, we  
cannot review the BIA’s original final order of removal, or its orders of  
October 13, 2008, or March 10, 2009.  See INA 242(b)(1) [8 U.S.C.  




 In his Reply Brief, De Leon-Gramajo contends that he is entitled to  
equitable tolling of the time limitations based on ineffective assistance of  
counsel.  See Reply Br. 2-5.  Because, however, he did not exhaust this  
claim before the BIA, we lack jurisdiction over it.  See Bonhometre v.  
Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 447 (3d Cir. 2005).   
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Generally, however, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to reopen sua 
sponte.  See Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 474-75 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that 
sua sponte reopening authority is committed to the Board’s unfettered discretion and 
there is no meaningful standard against which the exercise of that discretion can be 
judged).  While we may review the BIA’s decision to determine whether it arbitrarily 
departed from its precedent or “settled course of adjudication” in refusing to reopen sua 
sponte, see Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 250 (3d Cir. 2006), De Leon-Gramajo does 
not allege that this exception is applicable here.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny De Leon-Gramajo’s petition for review.
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 The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is denied. 
